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The New York Department of Financial Service’s New
Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: A Model for
Improvement
I. INTRODUCTION
Organizations such as ISIS, al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Boko
Haram rely on vast amounts of money moving around the world to fuel
their terror efforts.1 These funds are utilized for a number of purposes
such as salaries and benefits, recruitment, bribes, explosives, guns, and
tactical gear.2 Without substantial funding, a terrorist organization
either will not be able to execute attacks, or the impact of their attacks
will be reduced.3 For example, it is estimated that the September 11,
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, paid for by al Qaeda, cost
between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and execute.4 A significant
portion of that money went toward paying the nineteen operatives
responsible for the execution of the attack.5 Khalid Sheik Mohammed,
the “principal architect of the 9/11 attacks,” used wire transfers and cash
to provide the funds.6 These funds were either carried into the United
States7 or deposited overseas and then accessed from within the United

1. Michael Freeman, Introduction to Financing Terrorism: Case Studies, in
FINANCING TERRORISM: CASE STUDIES 3, 3 (Michael Freeman ed., 2012).
2. Id.
3. See id. (describing the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and noting that the
organizer, Ramzi Yousef had stated that if he had been able to obtain more funds, the bomb
used would have contained more explosives and created destruction on a much larger scale).
4. THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
169 (2004).
5. Id. at 172.
6. Id. at 145.
7. Multiple operatives received cash before traveling to the United States. Michael
Freeman & Moyara Ruehsen, Terrorism Financing Methods: An Overview, 7 PERSPECTIVES
ON TERRORISM, no. 4, Aug. 2013, at 5, 8, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/
35989/Freeman_Terrorism_Financing_2013.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
The
operatives brought this cash into the United States, often declaring it at customs. Id. The
most money brought in by one operative was $35,000 by Zacarious Moussaoiu. Id. He
declared this money at customs. Id.
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States.8 Mohammed’s nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, also wired
$114,500 to the United States that was used by an associated cell in
Hamburg to pay for flight training.9 This amount was transferred over
the course of only five transfers that ranged from $5,000 to $70,000,
and went undetected by authorities.10
A significant amount of money utilized by
terrorist
11
organizations flows through financial institutions globally. Terrorist
organizations raise money through multiple avenues, including criminal
activity12 and private donations from interested individuals or groups.13
These organizations exploit a number of different methods to move
their capital through the financial system; these methods are constantly
evolving, leading to difficulties in cracking down on the activities.14
The most common methods include, but are not limited to: setting up
offshore shell companies, front organizations, or trusts to receive
money; transferring money from the bank accounts of charitable and
non-profit organizations under the guise of a “gift;” and purchasing real
estate and art to conceal the origination of money.15 Terrorist

KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 172.
KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 224. According to the 9/11 Commission
report, Ali was not required to provide identification when making these transfers, nor were
the aliases that he chose questioned about their authenticity or validity. KEAN & HAMILTON,
supra note 4, at 224.
10. KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 224.
11. See generally Maria A. de Dios, The Sixth Pillar of Anti-Money Laundering
Compliance: Balancing Effective Enforcement With Financial Privacy, 10 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 495 (2016) (describing the current status of AML laws and the need for a
global system to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism).
12. See generally FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS
13–23 (2015) [hereinafter FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS], http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf (highlighting the
traditional and known methods used by terrorist organizations to generate revenue for their
operations). Terrorist organizations engage in significant criminal activity, the proceeds of
which help to fund their terror efforts. Id. They engage in identity theft to directly steal
funds, fraud, illegal smuggling of goods, bank robberies, drug trafficking, extortion,
kidnapping. Id.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 20–23.
15. PETER REUTER, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING
27–33 (2004); FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 13–20 (“[T]errorist
organi[z]ations rely on numerous sources of income and . . . they use a range of methods to
move funds, often internationally, to their end point without being detected.”). The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has included in their DSC Risk Management
Manual of Examination Policies a fairly exhaustive list of “money laundering red flags.”
FIN. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DSC RISK MGMT. MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 8.1, at 39–
44 (2005) [hereinafter BSA MANUAL], https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/
8.
9.
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organizations are also increasingly relying on cash in an effort to avoid
monitoring and detection of their operations.16 Often, transfers
involving banks are smaller in size in an effort to limit exposure and
avoid detection, and may later be combined with other deposits for
financing purposes.17 Money launderers use small-scale transfers to
structure deposits, which can often evade the reporting thresholds for
Customer Transaction Reports (“CTR”) and Suspicious Activity
Reports (“SAR”), which are required under the Bank Secrecy Act
(“BSA”).18 CTRs require reporting of “currency transactions” over
$10,000, while SARs require reporting of transactions over $5,000 that
may involve money laundering or violations of the BSA.19 All financial
institutions are susceptible to small-scale transfers.20 Because of their
large size and substantial number of transactions, however, the
vulnerability of large financial institutions is particularly concerning, as
section8-1.pdf. Such red flags include, inter alia, structured or recurring, non-reportable
transactions; customer refusal or reluctance to provide information or identification;
multiple third parties conducting separate, but related, non-reportable transactions;
transactions which are not consistent with the customer’s business, occupation, or income
level; numerous deposits under $10,000 in a short period of time, accounts with a high
volume of activity and low balances; and large amounts of cash maintained in a safe deposit
box. Id.; see Tom Wright & Bradley Hope, Behind the IMDB Scandal: Banks That Missed
Clues and Bowed to the Pressure, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the1mdb-scandal-banks-that-missed-clues-and-bowed-to-pressure-1473109548 (updated Sept.
6, 2016, 1:31 AM) (“That the alleged fraud could roll on for so long without detection
suggests weaknesses in a global system designed to clamp down on money laundering, a
problem U.S. and other western leaders have pledged to fix.”).
16. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH THE PHYSICAL
TRANSPORTATION OF CASH 3 (2015) [hereinafter FATF, MONEY LAUNDERING], http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-laundering-through-transportationcash.pdf.
17. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that money
laundering sometimes involves structured deposits of cash into bank accounts that are later
transferred elsewhere).
18. Infra Part III; see also BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 40–44 (highlighting
the various methods used by money launderers to prevent detection, including the
structuring of deposits, which is the most common suspicious activity reported to FinCEN).
19. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2016) (CTRs), 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1)–(4) (SARs); see also
infra Part III (describing CTRs, SARs, and their reporting requirements).
20. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“[T]errorism
financing through the banking sector is often small-scale and be difficult to distinguish from
the large number of legitimate financial transactions undertaken each day.”); Banking
Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements (“NYDFS
Regulation”) § 504.1 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/
adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf; see also KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 224 (describing how
Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transferred $114,500 undetected into the United States through smaller
transfers that “were essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing daily across the
globe”).
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they are less likely to detect these transactions taking place.21
The BSA,22 originally passed in 1970, requires banks to provide
certain records that are otherwise not obtainable in order to assist the
federal government in combating money laundering.23 Banks do this by
filing reports on currency transactions and customer relationships in the
form of CTRs and SARs.24 However, the BSA’s regulations must be
expanded at both the state and federal level to ensure sufficient
regulation to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.25
New York has recently adopted a regulation, to be enforced by
the New York Department of Financial Services, to enhance these
efforts.26 It increases regulation in an area that is vulnerable and subject
to significant corruption, and its implementation could have a dramatic
impact on the financing of terrorism.27 The regulation provides a higher
level of structure to the existing federal BSA and anti-money laundering

21. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“The sheer size and
scope of the international financial sector gives terrorist groups and financiers the
opportunity to blend in with normal financial activity to avoid attracting attention.”).
22. The BSA’s full title is the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and
Foreign Transactions Act of 1970.
23. The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions
Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq (2015).
24. See BSA MANUAL supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1–5, 45–48 (describing the process of
filing a CTR or SAR and the effectiveness of these reports); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1)
(2015) (allowing for the Secretary of the Treasury to require reporting of suspicious
transactions).
25. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.1 (noting that shortcomings have been found in the
compliance with BSA/AML laws and regulations that necessitated the clarifying
regulation).
26. Id. The New York Department of Financial Services has even more recently
proposed legislation to protect financial institutions from cyber attacks, which can also
provide a source of funding for terrorism. See Greg Farrell, New York Financial Regulator
Rolls Out Cybersecurity Proposals, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-13/new-york-financial-regulator-rolls-outcybersecurity-proposals (describing the recently proposed legislation that would protect
financial institutions from cyber attacks). The proposed legislation would require banks and
insurance companies to create cybersecurity programs and designate an “internal
cybersecurity officer.” Id.
27. See NYDFS Regulation § 504 (“[T]he Department has reason to believe that
financial institutions have shortcomings in their transaction monitoring an filtering
programs.”); see also CONNIE M. FRIESEN & JOEL D. FEINBERG, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,
UPDATE: NEW YORK BANKING REGULATOR ISSUES ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING RULES FOR
TRANSACTION MONITORING AND FILTERING PROGRAMS 4 (July 7, 2016), http://
www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2016/07/20160707-banking-and-financial-servicesupdate-1.pdf (stating that the Department of Financial services “can be expected to take an
aggressive approach in the enforcement of the Final Rule”).
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(“AML”) laws that guide New York state regulated institutions.28
“Regulated institutions” include (1) “all banks, trust companies, private
bankers, savings banks, and savings and loan associations chartered” in
New York; (2) “all branches and agencies of foreign banking
corporations licensed” in New York; and (3) “all check cashers and
money transmitters licensed” in New York.29 The regulation could
establish an important precedent of states taking affirmative steps to
combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.30 However,
this additional regulation only represents a model for improvement,
which should be followed by other states.31 The federal government
should collaborate with states, such as New York, to pass similar
meaningful and productive legislation to reduce the utilization of
financial institutions for purposes of money laundering and the
financing of terrorism.32
This Note examines in depth the New York Department of
Financial Service’s recently enacted AML regulation and argues for
similar regulations nationwide. Part II of this Note highlights current
federal law and regulations relating to AML and the financing of
terrorism.33 Part III discusses the New York Department of Financial
Services regulation in its proposed and final form.34 Part IV analyzes
the regulation and highlights the critiques of the proposed regulation,
challenges that regulated institutions will face in implementing the
regulation, and unintended consequences of the regulation.35

28. See FRIESEN & FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 4 (advising that regulated institutions
“should review and, where necessary, enhance its existing programs to ensure that they are
reasonably designed and risk-based to meet the NYDFS’ requirements”).
29. NYDFS Regulation § 504.2; see infra Part II.
30. See Press Release, New York Department of Financial Services, DFS Issues Final
Anti-Terrorism Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Regulation (June 30, 2016)
[hereinafter NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement], http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
about/press/pr1606301.htm (discussing compliance gaps in the financial regulatory
framework that the regulation seeks to close).
31. See id. (“‘It is time to close the compliance gaps in our financial regulatory
framework to shut down money laundering operations and eliminate potential channels that
can be exploited by global terrorist networks and other criminal enterprises.’”).
32. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.1 (indicating that there are shortcomings in financial
institutions’ compliance with BSA/AML regulations and laws, prompting the need for this
regulation).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part IV.
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II. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Although originally conceived as an AML law, the BSA has
evolved to also encapsulate terrorism financing.36 The BSA requires
financial institutions to maintain records in relation to particular
transactions, as well as customer information, and regulates the
disclosure of those records for assistance in law enforcement efforts.37
The purpose of the BSA is to ensure financial institutions maintain
appropriate types of records “where such records have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings”
or “in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities,
including analysis, to protect against international terrorism.”38 The
USA Patriot Act amended and expanded the BSA after the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center to include the
language on intelligence, counterintelligence, and international
terrorism.39
Two reports through which covered institutions fulfill these
requirements include CTRs and SARs.40 These reports are filed with
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the agency
tasked with supervising and enforcing the provisions of the BSA.41 A
CTR is used to report any “currency transaction” over $10,000, for
which the bank must obtain identification information of the person
attempting to conduct the transaction.42 “Currency transaction” is
defined as “any transaction involving the physical transfer of currency
from one person to another and covers deposits, withdrawals,

36. See Bank Secrecy Act § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A) (2015) (“[S]uch records
may have in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including analysis,
to protect against domestic and international terrorism . . . .”).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2); see also BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1 (“The
purpose of the BSA is to require United States (U.S.) financial institutions to maintain
appropriate records and file certain reports involving currency transactions and a financial
institution’s customer relationships.”).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2).
39. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act”), 50 U.S.C. § 1816(a) (2015).
40. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1.
41. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 2. FinCEN, originally created in 1990, was
made a separate bureau within the Department of the Treasury in the USA PATRIOT Act.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/fincen.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
42. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2016).
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exchanges, or transfers of currency or other payments.”43 A SAR is
used to report a transaction under various circumstances, including: (1)
insider abuse involving any amount; (2) violations aggregating $5,000
or more where a suspect can be identified; (3) violations aggregating
$25,000 or more regardless of potential suspects; and (4) transactions
aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential money laundering or
violate the BSA.44 A transaction can involve, but is not limited to, a
deposit; withdrawal; transfer between accounts; exchange of currency;
extension of credit; sale of a stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other
monetary instrument or investment security; or any other payment,
transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a bank.45 Records that are filed
under the BSA must be maintained for five years.46 Once a CTR or
SAR has been filed, a financial institution is not permitted to notify its
customer.47 FinCEN receives all CTRs and SARs and coordinates
enforcement among various federal agencies, as they do not have any
independent enforcement authority.48
Since the passage of BSA, it has been expanded and
strengthened through multiple pieces of legislation49 including the

43. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1. “Currency” is defined as “currency and
coin of the U.S. or any other country as long as it is customarily accepted as money in the
country of issue; and a cashier’s check . . ., bank draft, traveler’s check, or money order
having a face amount of not more than $10,000.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.330(c)(1).
44. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1)–(4).
45. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(bbb)(1).
46. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(a)(2).
47. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2).
48. BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 2.
49. More recently, in a continued effort to increase protections against money
laundering and the financing of terrorism, the House of Representatives Task Force to
Investigate Terrorism Financing has recently proposed five pieces of legislation to further
the effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Press Release, U.S.
Representative Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Terrorist Financing Task Force Introduces
Counterterrorism Strategy (June 29, 2016), http://lynch.house.gov/press-release/terroristfinancing-task-force-introduces-counterterrorism-strategy. These pieces of legislation
include H.R. 5594, H.R. 5607, H.R. 5603, H.R. 5602, and H.R. 5606. Id. These bills
would, among other goals, increase the power of the Treasury by authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Id. Stephen
Lynch is a ranking member of the House of Representatives Terrorist Financing Task Force,
a task force created by the Financial Services Committee. Id. The Task Force was created
in 2015 and is charged with investigating how terrorist organizations utilize the global
financial system to finance their activities and passing legislation to combat those efforts.
See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Comm., U.S. House of Representatives, Committee to Create
Bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorist Financing (March 19, 2015), http://
financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398815.
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Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the Annuzio-Wylie AntiMoney Laundering Act of 1992.50 The Money Laundering Control Act
criminalized money laundering by individuals as well as the facilitation
of money laundering by financial institutions.51 The Anunzio-Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act required each financial institution to
establish anti-money laundering programs, which were to include, at a
minimum: “(1) the development of internal policies, procedures, and
controls; (2) the designation of a compliance offer; (3) an ongoing
employee training program; and (3) an independent audit function to
test programs.”52
III. NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 504
A.

Background of New York Proposed Regulation

In December 2015, Governor Andrew Cuomo announced
proposed regulations by the New York Department of Financial
Services designed to combat money laundering and the financing of
terrorism within New York regulated financial institutions.53 The
purpose of the proposed regulation was to fill gaps in the current
regulatory scheme promulgated by the current BSA/AML laws and
regulations and Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”)
requirements.54 Before proposing this regulation, the New York
Department of Financial Services conducted a series of investigations at
numerous financial institutions into compliance with current AML laws,
sanctions violations, and the impact on terrorist financing.55 Based on

50. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 § 1352(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957
(2015); Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)
(2015).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
52. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1).
53. Press Release, New York Department of Financial Services, Governor Cuomo
Announces Anti-Terrorism Legislation Requiring Senior Financial Executives to Certify
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Systems (December 1, 2015), http://
www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1512011.htm; see also Banking Division Transaction
Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements and Certifications (“Proposed NYDFS
Regulation”) § 504 (proposed Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/
proposed/rp504t.pdf (the proposed rule that accompanied the announcement of new
regulations by Governor Cuomo).
54. Proposed NYDFS Regulation § 504.1.
55. NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30.
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this information, the Department of Financial Services determined that
there were “shortcomings” generated by “a lack of robust governance,
oversight, and accountability at senior levels.”56 To overcome these
shortcomings, the regulation seeks to clarify the requirements of a
transaction monitoring program and a watch list filtering program
within a regulated institution.57 It was designed to create a system that
can better monitor and detect transactions involving those individuals
and organizations on OFAC sanction lists in an effort to ultimately
prevent them altogether.58
High profile BSA/AML enforcement actions instituted by the
New York Department of Financial Services, as well as the federal
government, likely contributed to the Department’s determination that
this regulation was necessary.59 For example, in March 2015,
Commerzbank, a German lender, agreed to pay $1.45 billion to settle
allegations of money laundering violations.60 These allegations
involved countless transactions that Commerzbank had made through
financial institutions located in the United States involving sanctioned
parties, as well as the bank’s engagement in practices that prevented the
detection of these transactions.61 In its consent order to Commerzbank,
the Department stated that:
[Commerzbank] maintained ineffective compliance
procedures relating to due diligence on its foreign
branches and its customers, failed to share information
about customers or transactions necessary for BSA/
AML compliance with the appropriate New York-based
compliance personnel, and constructed its monitoring
process and tools so as to reduce the number of alerts
that would be generated and require further

NYDFS Proposed Regulation § 504.1.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“The Department of Financial Services . . . has recently been involved in a
number of investigations into compliance by Regulated institutions . . . .”).
60. Samuel Rubenfeld and Eyk Henning, Commerzbank Settles U.S. Allegations of
Sanctions, Money-Laundering Violations, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/
commerzbank-to-settle-u-s-allegations-of-sanctions-and-money-laundering-violations1426177346 (updated Mar. 12, 2015, 4:00 PM).
61. Id.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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investigation.62
The deficiencies described in the case of Commerzbank, as well as
other incidents involving New York-regulated institutions, go to the
heart of the shortcomings that the regulation is attempting to remedy,
making it more likely that these enforcement actions served as a
contributing factor to the adoption of this regulation.63
B.

The Final Rule

On June 30, 2016, the New York Department of Financial
Services issued the final rule (“Final Rule”).64 This rule was passed
under the authority granted to the Department of Financial Services
under New York Financial Services Law § 30265 and New York
Rule
mandates
Banking Law §§37(3)66 and (4).67 The Final
“[r]egulated [i]nstitutions” to (1) maintain a transaction monitoring
program, (2) maintain a watch list filtering program, and (3) complete
an annual certification to ensure compliance.68 For purposes of the
Final Rule, “regulated institutions” include “bank regulated institutions”
and “nonbank regulated institutions.”69 “Bank regulated institutions”
include “all banks, trust companies, private bankers, savings banks, and
62. Commerzbank AG, 1 (New York Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Mar. 12, 2015) (consent
order), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea150312.pdf.
63. See id. at 2 (“Commerzbank failed to maintain sufficient controls, policies, and
procedures to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-money
laundering laws and regulations (‘BSA/AML’) of the United States and New York.”).
64. Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements
(“NYDFS Regulation”) § 504 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/
regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf. The regulation, in its final and codified form, is
referred to as the “Final Rule.” FRIESEN & FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 4.
65. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 302.a (McKinney 2016) (“The Superintendent shall have
the power to prescribe . . . rules and regulations and issue orders and guidance involving
financial products and services . . . .”).
66. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 37(3) (McKinney 2016) (“[T]he superintendent may require
any banking organization, licensed lender, licensed casher of checks, licensed mortgage
banker, foreign banking corporation licensed by the superintendent o do business in this
state, bank holding company and any non-banking subsidiary thereof, corporate affiliate of a
corporate banking organization . . . and any non-banking subsidiary of a corporation which
is an affiliate of a corporate banking organization . . . to make special reports to him at such
times as he may prescribe.”).
67. Id. § 37(4) (“The superintendent . . . may prescribe the form and contents of all
periodical and all special reports.”).
68. NYDFS Regulation §§ 504.3–504.4.
69. Id. § 504.2(e).
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saving and loan associations chartered pursuant to the New York
Banking Law” and “all branches and agencies of foreign banking
corporations licensed . . . to conduct banking operations in New
York.”70 “Nonbank regulated institutions” include “all check cashers
and money transmitters licensed” in New York.71 The Final Rule does
not extend regulation to any institution that is not regulated by the New
York Department of Financial Services, such as federal savings and
loan banks, federal savings banks, or national banks.72
The Final Rule took effect on January 1, 2017, with the first
compliance certification due on April 15, 2018.73 As this date is only
slightly more than fifteen months after the rule took effect, regulated
institutions will have to make swift changes to their systems in order to
ensure compliance.74 For institutions that have been maintaining
systems that are deficient under this standard, this may result in
significant cost.75
The transaction monitoring program, which can be either
manual or automated, requires regulated institutions to monitor
transactions that have already been completed to ensure compliance
with anti-money laundering and BSA regulations.76 This program must
include eight minimum attributes, to the extent applicable:
(1) be based on the Risk Assessment of the Institution;
(2) be reviewed and periodically updated at risk-based
intervals to take into account and reflect changes to
applicable BSA/AML laws, regulations and regulatory
70. Id. § 504.2(b).
71. Id. § 504.2(d).
72. Id. § 504; see also CHRISTOPHER L. ALLEN ET AL, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE

SCHOLER LLP, NEW YORK’S FINAL AML RULE AND STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES (July 12,
2016, 11:47 AM), http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/07/newfinal-aml-rule-and-strategic-alternatives (“[T]he final rule does not apply to bank and
nonbank institutions not already subject to the supervision of the DFS, such as national
banks, federal savings banks, and federal savings and loan associations chartered by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or U.S. out-of-state banks with branch officers or
other facilities located in New York.”).
73. NYDFS Regulation § 504.6.
74. SATISH M. KINI ET AL, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, CLIENT UPDATE: NYDFS
ISSUES FINAL ANTI-MONEY AND SANCTIONS RULE 2 (July 6, 2016), http://
www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/07/
20160706_nydfs_issues_final_anti_money_laundering_and_sanctions_rule.pdf.
75. Id.
76. NYDFS Regulation § 504.3(a).
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warnings, as well as any other information determined
by the institution to be relevant from the institution’s
related programs and initiatives; (3) appropriately match
BSA/AML risks to the institution’s businesses, products,
services, and customers/counterparties; (4) BSA/AML
detection scenarios with threshold values and amounts
designed to detect potential money laundering or other
suspicious or illegal activities; (5) end-to-end, pre- and
post-implementation testing of the Transaction
Monitoring Program, including, as relevant, a review of
governance, data mapping, transaction coding, detection
scenario logic, model validation, data input and Program
output; (6) documentation that articulates the
institution’s current detection scenarios and the
underlying assumptions, parameters, and thresholds; (7)
protocols setting forth how alerts generated by the
Transaction Monitoring Program will be investigated,
the process for deciding which alerts will result in a
filing or other action, the operating areas and individuals
responsible for making such a decision, and how the
investigative and decision-making process will be
documented; and (8) be subject to an on-going analysis
to assess the continued relevancy of the detection
scenarios, the underlying rules, threshold values,
parameters, and assumptions.77
This program allows institutions to determine whether the reporting of a
particular transaction is necessary within the BSA/AML framework.78
The second requirement, the watch list filtering program,
requires regulated institutions to monitor transactions before they are
completed to ensure compliance with AML and BSA regulations.79
This program requires regulated institutions to “interdict,” or intercept,
transactions made by individuals and entities that are prohibited from
making such transactions by financial authorities such as the OFAC.80
77. Id. § 504.3(a).
78. Id. § 504.2 (defining “transaction monitoring program”).
79. Id. § 504.3(b).
80. Id.
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The OFAC works to enforce economic sanctions against targeted
foreign countries, individuals, entities, and practices to further U.S.
foreign policy and national security objectives.81 It maintains and
publishes sanctions lists of “individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries.”82 It also
maintains and publishes non-country specific lists that detail
individuals, groups, or entities such as terrorist groups, with whom
United States citizens or permanent residents are not allowed to engage
in transactions.83 The Final Rule seeks to further these objectives by
providing guidance on how to maintain a transaction monitoring
program and a watch list filtering program that prevents transactions
with these sanctioned entities, groups, or individuals.84
The watch list filtering program must meet five minimum
attributes, to the extent applicable.85 It must:
(1) be based on the Risk Assessment of the institution;
(2) be based on technology, processes or tools for
matching names and accounts, in each case based on the
institution’s particular risks, transaction and product
profiles; (3) include end-to-end, pre- and postimplementation testing of the Filtering Program,
including, as relevant, a review of data matching, an
evaluation of whether the OFAC sanctions list and
threshold settings map to the risks of the institution, the
logic of matching technology or tools, model validation,
and data input and Program output; (4) be subject to ongoing analysis to assess the logic and performance of the
technology or tools for matching names and accounts, as
well as the OFAC sanctions list and the threshold
81. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, AND
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/
virtual/bsa.pdf.
82. See Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (containing information on the sanctions lists and allowing users
to simultaneously search all the lists).
83. Id.
84. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.3(b) (requiring that programs be “reasonably
designed for the purpose of interdicting transactions that are prohibited by OFAC”).
85. Id.
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settings to see if they continue to map to the risks of the
institution; and (5) documentation that articulates the
intent and design of the Filtering Program tools,
processes, or technology.86
In addition to the specific requirements of each program, both
the transaction monitoring and watch list filtering programs must
require, to the extent applicable:
(1) identification of all the data sources that contain
relevant data; (2) validation of the integrity, accuracy
and quality of data to ensure that accurate and complete
data flows through the Transaction Monitoring and
Filtering Program; (3) data extraction and loading
processes to ensure a complete and accurate transfer of
data from its source to automated monitoring and
filtering systems, if automated systems are used; (4)
governance and management oversight, including
policies and procedures governing changes to the
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program to ensure
that changes are defined, managed, controlled, reported,
and audited; (5) vendor selection process if a third party
vendor is used to acquire, install, implement, or test the
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program or any
aspect of it; (6) funding to design, implement and
maintain a Transaction Monitoring and Filtering
Program that complies with the requirements of this
Part; (7) qualified personnel or outside consultant(s)
responsible for the design, planning, implementation,
operation, testing, validation, and on-going analysis, of
the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program,
including automated systems if applicable, as well as
case management, review and design making with
respect to generated alerts and potential filings; and (8)
periodic training of all stakeholders with respect to the

86.

Id.
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Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program.87
Together, the transaction monitoring and filtering programs are intended
to prevent or interdict illegal or suspect transactions.88
The third requirement, the annual certification, requires that
regulated financial institutions complete an Annual Board Resolution or
Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding, due by April fifteenth of each
year to the Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial
Services, stating that the bank is complying with the regulation.89
Under the proposed rule, this requirement was controversial because the
filing of an incorrect or false certification statement could have resulted
in criminal penalties for the “Certifying Senior Officer” of the bank.90
In the Final Rule, the Department of Financial Services removed the
possibility of criminal penalties against the filing officer.91 Instead, the
“regulation will be enforced pursuant to, and is not intended to limit, the
Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws,” meaning the
Superintendent can take any measures allowable under currently
existing laws to enforce the regulation.92
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK REGULATION
Adopting regulations to combat money laundering by statechartered banks strengthens the existing regulatory structure enacted to
prevent the financing of terrorism.93 The federal government has
traditionally regulated financial institutions in regards to AML
measures.94 Federal regulations apply to all financial institutions,
87. Id. § 504.3(c).
88. See id. § 504.1 (describing the ultimate goals of the increased regulations).
89. Id. § 504.4.
90. Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements and

Certifications (“Proposed NYDFS Regulation) § 504.5 (proposed Dec. 1, 2015), http://
www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/proposed/rp504t.pdf (“A Certifying Senior Officer who
files an incorrect or false Annual Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties for
such filing.”).
91. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.5 (“This regulation will be enforced pursuant to, and
is not intended to limit, the Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”).
92. Id.
93. MICHAEL T. GERSHBERG, STEVEN M. WITZEL & JUSTIN A. SCHENCK, FRIED, FRANK,
HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON, LLP, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
PROPOSED RULE TO INCREASE AML AND SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS (Mar. 28,
2016), http://documents.lexology.com/86410726-7cb6-4de1-9ad9-dc1c19e5db24.pdf.
94. See BSA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 1–48 (describing the federal BSA/AML
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regardless of whether their charter comes from the federal government,
state government, or a foreign government.95 Although state banks and
other nonbank financial institutions are typically smaller in asset size
and can more easily monitor transactions and detect suspicious activity,
their vulnerability to money laundering remains high.96 The Final Rule
is intended to fill the gaps left in the regulatory scheme that allow this
vulnerability.97 It was not enacted without analysis, commentary, and
criticism, however.98 Additionally, the Final Rule presents many
challenges for regulated institutions and could result in unintended
consequences for the state of New York.99
A.

Critique of the New York Regulation

Prior to adoption, many experts, including banking groups such
as the American Bankers Association, felt the proposed regulation did
not align with present federal regulations.100 These experts believed
that the proposed regulation would not hinder terrorist efforts to move
money through the financial system because the regulation will often be
inconsistent with federal regulations.101 In the opinion of the New York
Bankers Association, “the proposal w[ould] layer duplicative and
sometimes inconsistent requirements over an already comprehensive set
of federal rules.”102
regulatory structure).
95. Suzanne Barlyn, Bank Groups Pan Proposed New York Rules to Prevent Illicit
Financing, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/new-yorkmoneylaundering-rules-idUSL2N17417D.
96. See FATF, EMERGING TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“The
sheer size and scope of the international financial sector gives terrorist groups and financiers
the opportunity to blend in with normal financial activity to avoid attracting attention.”).
97. See NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30 (“It is time
to close the compliance gaps in our financial regulatory framework to shut down money
laundering operations and eliminate potential channels that can be exploited by global
terrorist networks and other criminal enterprises.”).
98. See Barlyn, supra note 95 (discussing the criticism that various banking groups
gave about the proposed rule).
99. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (discussing “strategic alternatives” banks can act
upon to avoid compliance with the final rule).
100. Barlyn, supra note 95.
101. Barlyn, supra note 95.
102. Barlyn, supra note 95. The American Bankers Association also felt that the
proposed rule would create inconsistent regulations and lead to a decrease in effectiveness
of the Regulations. Barlyn, supra note 95. To view the comment submitted by the
President and CEO of the American Bankers Association, go to http://www.aba.com/
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The New York Department of Financial Services, as a result,
adjusted the Final Rule to reflect many of these objections.103 Most
notably, the criminal liability provision for compliance officers was
removed from the regulation, although under existing law bank officials
may still be criminally liable as a result of submitting false reports.104
An interesting consideration in regards to this regulation is whether
criminal penalties will still be pursued for violations of this
regulation.105 While the Final Rule does not specifically call for
criminal liability as the proposed rule did, New York state law still
allows for criminal liability, inter alia, for offering a false instrument for
filing and failing to maintain accurate books and records.106 There is no
doubt that the Department of Financial Services possesses the ability to
bring criminal charges, but whether they will exercise that ability to
enforce the regulation remains to be seen.107 Regardless, these state
laws are important tools that the New York Department of Financial
Services can utilize if abuse of the regulation occurs.108
B.

Challenges in Implementing the New York Regulation

The Final Rule presents numerous challenges for covered
institutions, but the legislation is an essential step towards offering
better protection to New York financial institutions and the greater
financial system from money laundering.109 This in turn can have a
positive effect on reducing terrorist financing.110 One challenge that
Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/cl-NYDFS-TransactionMonitoring2016.pdf.
103. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 1–2.
104. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, CLIENT MEMORANDUM: NYDFS ISSUES FINAL
RULE ON TRANSACTION MONITORING AND FILTERING PROGRAMS FOR REGULATED
INSTITUTIONS 5 (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter DAVIS POLK], https://www.davispolk.com/sites/
default/files/NYDFS.Final_.Transaction.Monitoring.7.22.16.pdf.
105. See id. (“It is still possible to be criminally liable for violations of the Final Rule
under existing New York banking and penal laws . . . .”).
106. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 175.10 (McKinney 2016) (Falsifying Business Records),
175.35 (Offering False Instrument for Filing); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 672.1 (McKinney
2016) (Falsification of Books and Reports).
107. DAVIS POLK, supra note 104, at 5.
108. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 104, at 5 (stating that it is “still possible to be
criminally liable for violations of the Final Rule under existing New York banking and
penal laws”).
109. See KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4–5 (describing the difficulties that covered
institutions will face in implementing the regulations).
110. Barlyn, supra note 95.
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covered institutions will face is the short time frame available for
implementation.111 The Final Rule became effective on January 1,
2017, and the first compliance finding is due April 15, 2018, so
institutions must act quickly to implement the transaction monitoring
institutions,
and watch list filtering programs.112 While some
particularly larger ones, already have similar programs in place, they
will surely have to go further in their efforts.113 Based on the findings
by the Department of Financial Services prior to proposing this
regulation, these programs were inadequate and ineffective in
preventing these transactions from taking place.114 With the
implementation of these programs, particularly in institutions that do
not already have them in place, comes a large cost.115 To implement
these programs, institutions will be forced to run risk assessments and
determine whether or not their present programs comply with the
regulation.116 If the institution determines that their systems are not
sufficient then they will have to spend additional money implementing
these programs prior to the first compliance finding due date.117
Another hurdle that covered institutions will have to contend
with is the ambiguous language of the Final Rule.118 The Final Rule

KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 2. In May of 2016, the Department of the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) passed legislation that expanded
requirements for customer due diligence, which covered institutions will have to implement
in addition to the Final Rule. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial
Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29398 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010,
1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026); SATISH M. KINI ET AL., DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, CLIENT
UPDATE: FINCEN ISSUES NEW RULE REQUIRING IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERS
AND RISK-BASED CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE 1 (May 16, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/
~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/05/
20160516b_fincen_issues_new_rule_requiring_identification_of_beneficial_owners_and_ri
sk_based_customers_due_diligence.pdf.
113. See FRIESEN & FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 4 (“[E]ach regulated institution should
review and, where necessary, enhance its existing programs to ensure that they are
reasonably designed and risk-based to meet the NYDFS’ requirements.”).
114. See Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements
(“NYDFS Regulation”) § 504.1 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/
regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf (“As a result of these investigations, the Department
identified shortcomings in the transaction monitoring and filtering programs of the
institutions attributable to a lack of robust governance, oversight, and accountability at
senior levels.”).
115. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
116. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
117. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
118. KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
111.
112.
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contains technical industry language that is not defined in the
regulation.119 While the requirements are fairly well outlined in the
Final Rule, implementation will almost certainly look different at each
institution and there will not be a “one size fits all” solution.120
Accordingly, the Department of Financial Services will have to develop
a strategy for analyzing compliance of such varying degree.121
C.

The Unintended Consequences of the New York Regulation

A thought-provoking potential side effect of the regulation is the
possibility of a decrease in regulated financial institutions that are
chartered or licensed in New York.122 This regulation has the potential
to pose significant costs for some institutions, and at the very least
provides significantly more regulation.123 In addition, there is also the
possibility of liability for individuals responsible for certification.124
The increased costs and regulations, as well as potential liability may
drive regulated institutions to consider “strategic alternatives” to avoid
having to comply with the regulation, which would dictate that the
institution not be under the supervision of the New York Department of
Financial Services.125 To accomplish this, New York state-chartered
banks may choose to convert to a nationally chartered bank or relocate
to another state and take up charter in its new home state.126
Additionally, state-licensed nonbank institutions may convert to a

KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4.
See KINI ET AL, supra note 74, at 4–5 (“Implementation of these requirements may
look different at each institution, and it is not clear how the NYDFS will seek to assess
covered institutions’ efforts to comply . . . .”).
122. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (stating that increased compliance measures may
lead institutions to seek a different charter or relocate operations to a new geographic area).
123. KINI, ET AL, supra note 74, at 4 (“For some institutions, the cost of implementing
the required changes may be high.”).
124. See DAVIS POLK, supra note 105, at 5 (indicating that criminal liability is still a
possibility for certifying officers under existing New York banking and penal laws); N.Y.
Penal Law §§ 175.10 (McKinney 2016) (Falsifying Business Records), 175.35 (Offering
False Instrument for Filing); N.Y. Banking Law § 672.1 (McKinney 2016) (Falsification of
Books and Reports).
125. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (providing alternatives to implementing the
increased regulations, including converting to a national bank charter or relocating
operations to a new state).
126. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72.
119.
120.
121.
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national license.127 It is entirely possible that this well-meaning
regulation could produce unintended negative consequences for New
York, including the loss of fee revenue collected from regulated
institutions.128 This is particularly true if the federal government does
not adopt a similar regulation nationally, which could result in a
significant number of state entities switching their charters or licenses to
their national equivalent.129
On the other hand, in terms of national policy, New York’s
increased regulations allow the federal government to observe the
effects and consequences of these new requirements, and make a
reasoned decision whether similar legislation is necessary or feasible at
the federal level.130 The United States’ dual banking system, in which
states are intended to be laboratories for experimentation, gives the
federal government the benefit of “testing” legislation or regulations
before they are adopted on a national level.131 If this regulation is
successful in limiting or preventing money laundering, and as a result,
the financing of terrorism, the federal government should pass similar
and meaningful legislation to increase regulations.132
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Through the Final Rule, New York is cracking down on
financial institutions in an effort to prevent money laundering and the
financing of terrorism.133 The new regulation enhances the security of
the already existing federal BSA/AML laws and clarify the
requirements and expectations for financial institutions.134 Despite the
See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72.
See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72.
See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72.
See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING
SYSTEM
8
(2003),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/otherpublications-reports/national-banks-and-the-dual-banking-system.pdf (“[T]he varied powers
and regulatory approaches possible in different states enable state systems to serve as
laboratories for innovation . . . .”).
131. Id. at 10.
132. See id. at 8–9 (describing the functionality of the state banking systems as
laboratories for innovation and change at the federal level).
133. See Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements
(“NYDFS Regulation”) § 504.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/
regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf (“This regulation will be enforced pursuant to, and is not
intended to limit, the Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”).
134. Id. § 504.1.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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costs and difficulties that covered institutions will face during initial
implementation, the long-run benefits of the Final Rule will outweigh
the short-term drawbacks.135 Financial institutions, particularly large
institutions, conduct such a high volume of transactions on a daily basis
that without effective monitoring programs, suspect transactions can
slip through the cracks.136 New York has taken existing regulations and
expanded them to further protect the financial system through its
regulated institutions, including state-chartered banks.137
It is now incumbent on the federal government to follow the
example set by the state of New York and increase regulation for
nationally chartered banks.138 High profile enforcement actions against
institutions such as JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup in recent years have
suggested that the current BSA/AML regulations are not stringent
enough to adequately protect our financial system from the
consequential vices that necessitate enforcement actions.139 The
unintended consequences of this regulation that may result, namely the
state to federal charter flip, highlight the necessity of Congress adopting
a similar regulation at the federal level.140 If this regulation were passed
on a national level, it would circumscribe any attempt for an institution
to avoid compliance by seeking a national charter or license.141
Although nationally chartered banks are already subject to a
substantial amount of regulation, they house a significant portion of the
nation’s assets and play an integral role in the global economy.142 If
135. See id. (seeking to clarify the requirements for financial institutions to reduce
shortcomings and improve the systems for greater effectiveness).
136. See FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS, supra note 12, at 21 (“[T]errorism
financing through the banking sector is often small-scale and can be difficult to distinguish
from the large number of legitimate financial transactions undertaken each day.”).
137. See NYDFS Regulation § 504.1 (clarifying transaction monitoring and watch list
filtering program requirements and adding an annual certification requirement).
138. See NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30 (describing
the increased regulations that will close gaps in the current regulatory scheme).
139. See generally Jill Schlesinger, JPMorgan Chase: Bank Faces Major Regulatory
Action, CBS: MONEYWATCH (Jan. 11, 2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
jpmorgan-chase-bank-faces-major-regulatory-action/ (describing the enforcement action JP
Morgan Chase faced in relation to it’s AML and compliance programs and noting other
major AML enforcement actions).
140. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72 (describing steps that covered institutions can take
to avoid compliance with the regulations, including adopting a national charter).
141. ALLEN ET AL, supra note 72.
142. See Large Commercial Banks, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, FED. RESERVE
BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/ (updated June 30, 2016) (ranking
the largest commercial banks in the United States by consolidated assets and indicating what
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efforts to hinder exploitation of the financial system to aid money
laundering and the financing of terrorism are to be successful,
regulations must be stricter in these areas.143 The federal government
must work in conjunction with states, such as New York, to ensure that
its regulations are sufficient and do not provide conflicting requirements
that place an ever-growing demand on financial institutions.144 If the
existing regulatory structure stays intact as is, an infinite number of
transactions will remain undiscovered, as they do today, and the
prevalence of terrorism will not decrease.145 This regulation has effects
that reach beyond the state of New York, and money laundering does
not happen there exclusively.146 For this or similar regulations to be
effective, their mandates must be implemented across all state and
federal jurisdictions.147
ROY G. DIXON III*

charter the bank holds).
143. See NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30 (“It is time
to close the compliance gaps in our financial regulatory framework to shut down money
laundering operations and eliminate potential channels that can be exploited by global
terrorist networks and other criminal enterprises.”).
144. NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30.
145. NYDFS Anti-Terrorism Legislation Announcement, supra note 30.
146. See, e.g., KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 4 (highlighting the global reach and
effects of terrorism).
147. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 130, at 8–9 (describing the state
banking system as laboratories for change at the national level).
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